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Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review
The Economic Consequences of the
Political Crisis
Ronan Porhel
1 On the eve of the elections, the Kenyan economy was presented as the best performing in
a region marked by armed conflicts (Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan or the Great Lakes
region) and, thus sometimes experienced chaotic economic development. The political
crisis  led  to  the closure  of  factories,  to  the  accumulation  of  delays  in  supplies,  to
cancellation after cancellation by tour operators in the tourism sector and even to the
collapse of the stock market. The stage was thus set for impoverishment of the country
but also the region, since Kenya is, for geographical reasons especially, the gateway for
supplies to many landlocked countries in East and Central Africa.
2 Nevertheless, the Kenyan economy was going through a phase of growth, which began
during President Mwai Kibaki’s five-year term (2002–2007), both in terms of growth in
industries and tourism. This clear recovery, facilitated by the resumption of funding by
donors (particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), was a sign of
reassuring stability for investors, which was beneficial for the region as a whole. This
meant that the political  crisis that Kenya was experiencing tarnished this image and
potentially had economic consequences, in the short-term and the long-term, that could
not be ignored, both for country and its neighbours.
 
Years of great beneficial economic growth
3 Since 2002 when M. Kibaki succeeded Daniel arap Moi, Kenya enjoyed a real improvement
of its economic indicators. These indicators augured well for the future and strengthened
its position as a regional leader.
 
A promising economic and financial situation
4 Kenya has a diversified1 industrial foundation and of a dynamic educated middle class. It
is for this reason the logistical distribution hub (sea port and airport) of East Africa,
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whose market it  penetrates with ease.  Finally,  Nairobi  is  a relatively robust financial
centre at the level of the whole African continent.
5 Since 1993, the country opted for a market economy which is more open to the outside
world, abandoning strategies based on import substitution. Whereas the tools of essential
control  of  balance  of  payments  and  protection  of  its  local  industry  depended  on
government  controls  (and  especially  the  use  of  licenses),2 the  main  instrument  of
commercial politics in Kenya therefore became its common external tariff in line with
GATT followed by WTO3 prescriptions, which should adjusted downwards within the East
African Community (EAC).4
6 From the economic point of view, the Kibaki government achievements seem positive.
The country resumed a path of growth that is more in conformity with a Developing
Country (DC), with growth rates above 5%. This is sharp contrast strongly with the end of
D. arap Moi’s rule when the rates revolved around zero per cent5. Moreover, Kenya is
characterized by a constant increase in the standard of living indicator; its GDP per capita
in parity with the purchasing power increased from 1,250 dollars in 2001 to 1,786 dollars
in 20066 (380 to 580 current dollars).  Particularly worth noting is the fact that these
results have been obtained with donor support of the about 1% of GDP compared to about
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10% donor  support  for  neighbouring Tanzania.  In  this  context,  Kenya is  cited as  an
example for the other African countries.




Growth rate of the GDP in volume (%)* 0.5 0.6 3 4.9 5.7 5.3
GDP pet capita (in PPP dollars)** 1200 1250 1270 1280 1786  
GDP per capita (in current dollars) 350 380   580  
Inflation rate (%) 6.1 3.3 11.4 10.3 14.5 12
Trade  balance  (%  of  the  GDP)  Current
balance (% of the GDP)













 2.1 2.41 1 4.16  
With grants   1 0.1 3.3 4
Public Debt (% of the GDP)    55.57 47.74  
IDE* (in billions of dollars) 110.9 53 46 21.2   
3. Social Indicators
Primary School (rate of registration) 68  76.4 82.1 83.2  
Life Expectancy (in years) 48.4   49  55.3
* In volume: the assessment of wealth produced is adjusted by inflation.
** Purchasing-Power Parity: The Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP) (means values measured in
purchasing-power parity) is a method used in economics to establish in comparison with other
countries the purchasing power of national currencies, which is cannot by simply using the exchange
rates. The PPP makes it possible to measure how much a currency facilitates the purchase of goods
and services in each of the zones compared.
7 The  direct  consequence  of  this  economic  growth  is,  however,  the  sinking  of  the
commercial deficits. In 2006, the country had a deficit of nearly 9% of its GDP7 in spite of
surplus in the balance of services (especially tourism) and two-digit inflation (14.5% in
2006). Paradoxically, this result, which was initially disappointing, was an expression the
vigorous recovery of the Kenyan economy, which has to import all its oil. Finally, the last
point about “Kaldor’s magic square,”8 the unemployment rate quickly decreased. Even
though it rose officially to 40%, the amount of contribution by the informal sector, which
is by definition unquantifiable, was so high that this figure lost its relevance. In Nairobi,
for example,  more than two out of three people work in the informal sector.9 Public
finances  remained  sustainable  in  the  eyes  of  the  IMF  in  spite  of  the  deteriorating
situation,10 mainly due to funding for free primary school.  The flow of foreign direct
investment remained positive but was on a sharp decline ($21 billion in 2005 compared to
over 100 billion in 2000) during M. Kibaki’s term. This decline can be explained both by
recovery by the closest neighbours, Tanzania and Uganda, which had regained political
stability by adhering to economic liberalism, and by a certain tendency by the country be
too risk-averse to open up to the foreign capital.  In this  connection,  there has been
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significant change in legislation to address the situation, including the simplification of
administrative procedures by creating a one-stop shop to process foreign investment
applications. The value of foreign investment passed the US$ 100,000 mark. Nevertheless,
evidence  revealed  reticence  over  possible  foreign  take-over  of  Kenyan companies  (a
practice that did not impede Kenyan investors in Uganda and Tanzania in any way). The
social situation remained fragile,11 however, with inequalities which were already high at
the beginning of M. Kibaki’s term (the country was ranked tenth on the world list of the
countries with the highest level  of  inequality in terms of  wealth) worsening and the
Human Development Indicator (HDI) continuing to drop since 1990.12 It is true that when
a poorly performing economy begins to grow very quickly, as was the case in Kenya, the
inequalities  become  more  pronounced.  The  growth,  which  was  concentrated  on  the
service industry, only benefited a part of the population, which was close to the president
and  those  working  in  expanding  sectors  (banks,  tourism  firms  and  communication
agencies),  while the poorest classes experienced reduction in their purchasing power.
Kenyan youth, who make up the majority of the population, felt particularly neglected,
even though better education had given them hope of having a better life than their
parents. In a country where life expectancy is 55 years, the persistent under-employment
in this section of the population can only be troubling.
8 These favourable growth rates can be explained by contribution from some very dynamic
sectors. They should help Kenya become, by 2030, a low-income to a medium-income
country (+ US$ 765 per capita per year from 1995).13 The primary sector is one of these
dynamic sectors.  It  accounts for 27.5% of the GDP14,  and undertakes crucial  activities
which attract foreign exchange either through fishing, coffee, tea or even horticulture.
For example, since 2005, Kenya is the first world exporter of black tea, which is the third
source  of  foreign exchange for  the  economy.  Tea  production takes  place  in  the  Rift
Valley, among other places. In the Kericho area, production has improved by 16% since
2001 (despite a decrease in 2006 due to drought), representing a growth of 41% in value
owing to the rise in world prices. Another example of the most dynamic sectors in the last
few years are horticultural crops, including about hundred products (fruits, vegetables,
flowers), making the sector the country’s fourth source of foreign exchange. Horticulture
rose by 64% in 2007 thanks to high international demand and poor climatic conditions in
Europe15. These products raked in close to 50 billion Kenyan Shillings (Kenya shillings)16,
including 63% from cut flowers alone17. These products, exported virtually exclusively to
Europe, account for 14% of the country’s total exports, which is 25% of the European
market. These crops are grown around Lake Naivasha, in Thika near Nairobi, in Kitengela,
and  also  around Mount  Kenya,  Lake  Nakuru  and recently  in  the  Rift  Valley  around
Eldoret.
9 The  secondary  sector,  which  has  more  often  than  not  a  wait-and-see  attitude  and
accounts for 17.6% of the GDP, has begun to rejuvenate, especially with the resurgence of
companies in the agro-food industry. Big groups of companies have emerged like the
Kenya Meat Commission, Mumias Sugar Company, Kenya Seed Company, or New Kenya
Cooperation Creameries. However, there is hope, especially from the tertiary sector that
represents now accounts for close to 55% of the GDP. It is dominated by tourist activities
which are growing rapidly (+10% in 2006 and second source of foreign exchange after the
remittances from the Kenyans in the Diaspora18). Following the Al-Qaida attacks in Kenya
in 1998 and 200219, income from this sector had fallen to €190 million in 2002 and then
rose to €617 million in 2006 (this triple growth is proof of real dynamism). The year 2007
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was a record year with over a million tourists visiting and a 15.4% rise in profits. For their
part, new information and communication technology (NICT), as well as banking20 and
financial sectors experienced a remarkable boom. Mobile telephony,21 for example, grew
rapidly with an average annual growth rate of 67% since 2001 and encouraging prospects
with regard to investments dedicated to infrastructure.22 Moreover, the Nairobi Stock
Exchange experienced growth of 280% in five years, which attests to the confidence of the
business community, and enabled the Kenya Shilling (Ksh) to appreciate during the whole
period  strengthening  against  the  dollar  from  Ksh  78.6  in  2002  to  Ksh  63.35  in
December 2007, an appreciation of nearly 20%. Likewise, in the “country risk” ranking,
according to Doing Business in 2008, Kenya rose from 82nd to 72nd position between 2006
and  2007  due  to  marked  improvement  in  access  to  credit,  which  encouraged
incorporation of companies at the same rate.
 
A pole of regional stability
10 In  the  East  African  region,  Kenya  is  characterized  by  relative  stability.  Indeed,  the
country has never been in open conflict with its neighbours and acts as a rear base for
refugees  from the Somali  and Sudanese  wars.  It  has  also  set  an example  on several
occasions  as  a  peace  facilitator,  especially  within  IGAD.23 This  intergovernmental
authority consists of seven northeast African States and especially works towards the
resolution of the crises in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.
11 Kenya, an economic leader in East Africa, is also an initiator of the regional integration
process as a member of the EAC (East African Community) and of the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern African States  (COMESA)24 (34% of  intra-regional  trade).  It  has
contributed to the opening up of markets by lowering its common external tariff and
exporting more than 42.6% of its products to Africa, close to 2/3 of which goes to Uganda
and Tanzania.
12 In  this  context,  Kenya  affirms  its  regional  economic  domination  by  controlling  an
important transit trade towards several landlocked countries in the region. This trade is
equivalent to a quarter of Uganda’s or Rwanda’s GDP and a third of Burundi’s GDP. This
trade is in a number of basic essential commodities.25 The Kenyan regional platform offers
a generally high level of infrastructure, road as well as sea port and airport. For example,
the port of Mombasa is the inevitable transit point for the region’s imports as well as
exports and makes it possible to access a large part of eastern Africa (Uganda and the
Great Lakes)26 via the use what is commonly known as “the northern corridor,” which
means combining road and rail to Kampala, complete with a Mombasa—Eldoret pipeline).
27 Several Kenyan companies therefore assume the role of regional leaders like the Kenya
Airways.  As  the region’s  dominant airline,  it  interconnects  the whole of  eastern and
southern  Africa  in  addition  to  big  international  destinations,  even  though  financial
difficulties have made its position relative for some years now.
 
A crisis with multiple repercussions
13 M.  Kibaki’s  swearing-in  to  serve  a  second  presidential  term  on  30 December  2007
triggered a  period of  high tension and violence.  The political  situation became very
unstable.  Economically,  as  Kenya  suffered  short-term  large  scale  damage,  the
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surrounding countries were also affected by the effects of this crisis, thus plunging East
Africa into uncertainty.
14 The assessment of the effects of the January 2008 events in Kenya is very delicate.  A
certain  historical  perspective  is  evidently  necessary  to  measure  the  consequences  in
precise terms; Finance Minister Amos Kimunya only talked about it recently. However,
we can already pinpoint the main obstacles at the national then regional level.
 
At national level
15 Right from the start, the Kenyan crisis was characterized by an escalation of violence in
several parts of the country: in western parts around Kisumu, in the Rift Valley and in
some parts of Nairobi. One can consider as the very first victims the business people, who
very quickly suffered slow business, at best, or at worst, a total disappearance of their
merchandise. In the initial days, 184 stores were looted and 80% of SMEs were affected in
Kisumu.28 Eldoret, which experienced remarkable growth these last few years and had the
potential of overtaking Nakuru, its neighbouring big town in the Rift Valley, bore the full
brunt  of  the  crisis  as  well  as  the  flight  of  workforce  and  investors.  The  effect  on
employment was disastrous (several thousands of jobs were lost in Kisumu and Eldoret).
All regions were affected by a shortage of essential goods. Thus, the Turkana District (to
the  north  of  the  country),  which  is  situated  in  an  arid  area  and  depends  on  other
provinces for food products,  experienced a 200% inflation in the prices of  fruits and
vegetables  due  to  deterioration  of  transportation,  worsening  the  shortage  of  these
products. In Kibera, the biggest slum in Nairobi, water and electricity were disconnected
in the first week of the clashes and the Toi market, the main supply point for residents,
was  completely  razed  down  by  rioters.  “There  were  3000  traders  here,  and  3000  others
depending on the market for their livelihood. If you count their families and the customers, 200,000
people were dependent on this place,” explained the chairman of the association of traders at
the market, Ezechiel Rema.29 Millions of shillings worth of food and clothes went up in
smoke on the first Sunday when the results were announced after rioters fired the stalls
belonging to members of the Kikuyu ethnic community, to which President M. Kibaki
belongs. Farmers no longer had access to markets, to which their daily survival depends.
16 In the second week of the crisis (beginning 7 January), deterioration in the supply of oil
products very quickly led to a crisis in all other sectors. Oil is indeed an input30 for most
activities. Since the supply points were the towns that were the most exposed to the
violence (Kericho,  Bomet,  Mumias,  Kisii  or Eldoret for example),  general  activity was
observed to slow down and hardly felt the resumption of transportation in mid-January.
Let us look at the effects on sectors that were most exposed to the crisis: tourism, the
milk industry, the agricultural sector, small enterprises and financial markets.
 
Financial markets which bowed but did not plunge
17 As soon as the Nairobi stock market opened on 2 January,  the sales plunged and the
Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) fell by 277 points, representing a loss of 5% value (about US
$ 629 million or Ksh 40 billion) of total stock capital (US$ 12 billion), which revealed a loss
of confidence by investors. The following day, dealing was suspended at mid-day when
the twenty share index dipped to 5,015.50 points whereas it had passed the 5300 points in
the course December 2007. This fall affected small as well as major investors.31 Similarly,
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the Kenyan currency, which had appreciated during M. Kibaki’s first term, was under
siege on the market. It depreciated to depths close to 10% within a few days, plunging
against the dollar from Ksh 62.68 on 24 December to Ksh 68.5 on 7 January. To reassure
investors,  and in spite of this decline in the main financial indicators,  NSE Chairman
Jimnah Mbaru tried to remain optimistic by maintaining that the targeted growth of 8%
in the 2007/2008 financial year was justified and went on to predict growth for the NSE
index from 30 to 40% citing fast recovery from the damage and the redirection of efforts
towards the devastated areas. Terry Ryan, independent economic adviser to the Central
Bank of Kenya, was more conservative and anticipated by 10 January a reduction in the
GDP growth rate of 4 to 5 points because of the sectors affected by the crisis.32 These
sectors were indeed some of  the most performing in the country’s  economy, namely
agriculture, tourism and financial services (31% of the GDP).
18 After the first month of crisis it could be said that its impact on the financial markets
needed to be qualified. On the one hand, the Stock market stabilized around 5000 points
for its  main index in mid-February.  In fact,  the call  by Citigroup for a certain strict
adherence to economic fundamentals and the injection of funds by Finance Minister A.
Kimunya,  obtained in part  from the privatization of  Telkom, helped to maintain the
market and the national currency under Ksh 70 to the US dollar.33 Thus, in spite of the
rise in bad debts, pressure on the interest rates was not excessively high at 0.5 points.34
This  could  have,  however,  contributed  to  the  slow  investment  in  an  uncertain  and
especially  more  expensive  environment.  Capital  inflow  expected  from  financial
transactions planned by the government faced fresh delay. This is what happened to the
joint venture  between  Safaricom  and  Vodafone  which  still  seemed  deadlocked
throughout February whereas the market awaited it to sustain the transactions. It could
be assumed that the set of the privatization programs were also doomed to delay. The
other big transaction which involved paying out $300 million in international debentures
in March 2008, in order to finance infrastructure programs, also was in danger of failing.
Although the finance minister announced on 27 December that the country enjoyed a
rather promising international rating (B+),35 the current situation was a reverse, this was
at  least  the  point  of  view  expressed  by  Betty Maina,  chief  executive  of  the  Kenya
Association of Manufacturers and of the chairman of the Corporate Council of Africa,36
Maurice Tempelsman. For its part, the Stephen Hayes group, which is among the largest
American companies,37 called upon investors to withdraw from the country and opt for
new steadier markets. So at the end of February the situation remained obviously fragile,
in anticipation of a political resolution of the crisis. The agreement to share power in the
coalition government signed on 28 February between re-elected President M. Kibaki and
opposition leader Raila Odinga restored relative confidence in the markets, and the sale
of Safaricom shares was thus planned to be held between 28 March and 23 April 2008, but
it would be adventurous to think that a return to normalcy could be achieved quickly.
 
A particularly affected tourism sector
19 By 3 January, during the middle of the high tourist season in Kenya, a high number of
flights from most of the English tour operators (the main “supplier,” with 290,000 tourists
per year), quickly followed by other countries (France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany and
Portugal),  caused an immediate loss estimated at about Ksh 4 billion and 120,000 jobs
from the first week, including 20,000 for the hotel industry alone.38 Less than 25% of the
forecasts seemed to be assured whereas the sector raked in US$ 916.3 million in 2007. The
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airlines, including Kenya Airways, directly bore the brunt of the backlash. The national
carrier anticipated a high fall in its turnover, and cancelled some flights at once, such as
Mombasa-Johannesburg or Mombasa-London.
20 After the first fifteen days of the crisis, with the political stand-off still in suspense and
political and social frustration taking an ethnic dimension, the sector, whose contribution
is 15% to national wealth, found itself in a particularly precarious situation. The hotel
occupancy in Mombasa remained lower than 80%39 recorded the previous year where the
rate of occupancy passed the 80% mark. The situation in Nairobi was hardly better as
occupancy oscillated between 15 and 35%. A loss of 78% of income for the first three
months is to be expected at Ksh 5.5 billion per month out of a total of Ksh 65.4 billion in
2007  (a  quarter  loss  in  2007),  according  to  Ongong’a  Achieng  (Executive  Director  of
Kenyan Tourism Board). The estimates for this first quarter were 314,995 people and the
adjustments bring it to 27,000 or a reduction of 91.4%. The cruise calendar which extends
from January to April was also affected by the same degree of cancellations. Finally, the
national parks recorded a reduction in the number of visitors. For example, the Tsavo-
East National Park, which receives 700 visitors daily during this period, received 170 and
lost two-thirds of the revenue.40 These successive setbacks led to 250,000 job cuts in the
tourism sector, a figure that could prove to be even higher.41 On the other hand, the fall
in the number of visitors since December 2007 had a considerable impact not only on
financial income, but also on a number of initiatives to conserve national parks and other
protected  areas  run  by  the  Kenya  Wildlife  Service  (KWS).42 Yet,  leaders  remained
optimistic and cited the examples of Morocco and Egypt.43 Under similar conditions, they
were able to recover fast enough. The arrival of 175 tourists from Europe in mid-February
and the arrival  of  the first  cruise ship,  the “Royal  Star,”  at  the Mombasa port  were
therefore  considered  the  first  sign  of  sector  recovery.  Following  the  signing  of  the
agreement between M. Kibaki and R. Odinga, hotel reservations rose ahead of the Easter
holidays.  They were mostly made local  tourists who took advantage of the low price
policy, 30% reduction, or even invitation from hotels to spend the holidays by the sea.
Though this politics was a transitory measure while waiting for the return of foreign
tourists, professionals, according to Kuldip Sondhi, director of the Mombasa and coast
tourism association,  were aware that Kenyans should contribute more to the sector’s
revenue in future.44
 
An agricultural sector punished by disruption of transport
21 Through its persistence, the crisis affected the agricultural sector in three ways. First of
all,  farms situated in the most risky districts in the north of the Rift Valley (such as
Kericho,  Bureti  and Bomet),  were been completely  destroyed in the numerous arson
attacks and looting associated with the clashes. Then, the inability by staff to commute to
their places of work or, even more dramatic, the feeding of the high number of victims
reduced  activity.45 Finally,  the  rise  in  crime  through  activities  of  organized  gangs
contributed to worsening insecurity on the main roads. An example is the erection of
road blocks on the Eldoret-Nairobi road via Nakuru. The sector could not withstand these
three causes:  20% of  the harvest  in the north Rift,46 the country’s  bread basket,  was
destroyed  and  the  land  could  not  be  prepared  during  the  January  rains  due  to  the
displacement of 20,000 families. While taking into account the forecasts to lower maize
harvest by between 15 and 70% (in southern Kenya), there were serious concerns over
food supplies for 2008.47 During the first week of crisis, tea plantations48 were adversely
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affected whereas horticulture (apart from scores of farms in the north Rift) could more or
less maintain its level of activity thanks to the social  policies on some farms around
Naivasha,49 which consisted providing on site accommodation for their employees. But
very quickly the escalation of violence caught up with this sector, particularly on Sunday
27 January,50 and production suddenly collapsed. 51 For the whole range of agricultural
activities, it is the third phase of the impact that became delicate to manage, meaning the
transportation  of  both  the  necessary  inputs  purchased  for  production  (fuel,  packing
material, manure, etc.) and the distribution of the harvested crop. The tea plantations
were able stock their produce initially but this strategy quickly became futile considering
the length of the crisis.  The farms, whatever their produce, were therefore forced to
transport their produce under escort like in Naivasha, Nyahururu, Limuru, Kiambu or
Athi River. This new constraint not only raised the cost of transportation with insurance
premiums in sky-rocketing rise but also prolonged the delivery times within a given
period (February, March) where the flower business achieved 40% of its turnover. Thus
the tea sector, which could have received a boost in exportation from the depreciation of
the national currency, incurred losses in several billions of shillings.52 Milk production,
which  halved,53 experienced  the  same  problems,  bearing  in  mind  that  most  of  the
resources were located in the Rift Valley. The prospects of resumption remained even
fuzzier  when demand shot  up,  especially  from refugees,  weakening some companies,
including New KCC, which was fighting to regain some financial stability. Despite the
losses estimated in billions of Kenya shillings, the Kenya Flower Council maintained that
the sector  copped quite  well  with the events,  compared for  example  to  the tourism
sector,  and  could  become  even  an  interesting  alternative  for  investment.  European
clients still expressed concern on Kenya’s capacity to provide a steady and quality supply
in the long term54 and threatened to turn more to the growing competition in Ethiopia.
To this contrasting image Eldoret area harboured ambitions of becoming an important
centre for horticulture but the chronic instability could new initiatives. The first Eldoret
—Netherlands airlift via Nairobi in the second week of February could just make the town
attractive once again.
 
Small entreprises teetering on the brink of bankruptcy
22 As a result of direct consequences of the crisis, the small enterprises sector was inevitably
faced with defaulting in  the  repayment  of  micro-credit  to  financial  institutions.  The
enterprises found it impossible to repay their loans,55 which according to Samuel Deya,56
put these financial establishments in difficulty and to a lesser degree the banking sector.57
Anne Mutahi, chairperson of the Kenyan Association of Micro-credit Institutions (AMFI)
admitted that 80% of credit, on a portfolio of Ksh 25 billion, will be rescheduled but the
micro-credit  sector  had  resolved  to  write  off  10  to  15%,  representing  a  loss  of  Ksh
4 billion.58 Sustaining the small enterprises is very vital for the Kenyan economy because
they contribute to 18.4% of  the wealth,  and even 25% outside agriculture.  They also
represent 74.2% of employment for the most underprivileged areas. The areas in question
are mostly the slums of Kibera and Mathare in Nairobi, Eldoret, Nakuru and Naivasha
towns in the Rift Valley, Kisumu in Nyanza, Kakamega in Western Province and finally
Mombasa in Coast Province. A mechanism of international aid was put in place in the
course of January for cushion the most seriously affected cases but it could soon become
insufficient.
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23 For public coffers,  this crisis from the very first week resulted in a daily loss of Ksh
2 billion (US$ 31.45 million) in fiscal resources.59 However, we should add US$ 200,000 in
customs revenue coming from trade with Uganda. In the end, the State, which had a Ksh
109 billion  budgetary  deficit  for  2007/2008  financial  year,  could  foresee  financial
difficulties to implement its policies, for example funding free secondary education. The
sharp decrease in fiscal revenue for the first quarter of 2008 due to disruption of industry,
transport,  tourism,  banking  and  horticulture,  reduced  the  government’s  room  for
manoeuvre when the situation required high levels of investment, and could force it to
resort  to internal  and external  borrowing.60 Moreover,  though mediation led by Kofi
Annan finally succeeded and managed to get the country out of political limbo, threats by
donors to withdraw once again from the country did not go away after all.  Thus, the
European  Union,  which  provided  over  € 290 million  (equivalent  to  Ksh 400 million)
between 2002 and 2007 could freeze or at least reduce the new tranche of € 383 million
(US$ 540 million) planned for the 2008–2013 period, leading to the cancellation in one
stroke of many infrastructure projects.61 The World Bank, which funds 16 projects in
Kenya to the tune of US$ 919 million, as well as three infrastructure projects in the region
to the tune of US$ 260 million, also considered the possibility of reducing its contribution.
 
At regional level
Landlocked countries quickly crippled
24 “When Kenya catches a cold, other countries (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi) catch pneumonia” the
Ugandan media observed.62 A look at the political and economic situation, the Kenyan
crisis  had  an  immediate  impact  on  economies  of  the  landlocked  countries  (Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi), 63 close to 100 million people depending on Kenya for the supply of
essential  products,  or fuel items, including oil.  Uganda proved to be very vulnerable.
Right from 1 January, the country closed its border in Busia to keep out violence, stations
of big oil companies (Shell, Caltex, Total, Mobil or Gapco) doubled the price of petrol per
liter (from 2,400 to 6,000 Uganda Shillings),64 and increase the price of diesel by 10%.
Moreover, this shortage of fuel forced the country to suspend some internal flights.65 The
inflation also affected the main products imported from Kenya, following the depletion of
stocks in all shops in the city of Kampala. The price of some products, like soap, increased
by 100%.
25 Continued violence throughout January sustained by activities of armed youth groups,
particularly along the Eldoret-Busia road, more or less paralyzed all the road as well as
rail traffic along the northern corridor,66 having a double effect of blocking the port of
Mombasa and adversely affecting the intra-regional trade. Thus, the port facilities at the
country’s second largest city was incapable to manage the continuous flow of containers
in spite of help from the port of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were quickly overrun. The peak
was attained in January with 19,000 containers neglected on the quay of the Kenyan port,
whose storage capacity is 7000 per day. The stock has reduced to 11,000 containers since
February but remains excessive67 for the normalization of activity. In fact, the situation
improved  slightly  since  Ugandan  Prime  Minister  Eriya  Kategaya’s  visit  to  Kenya  on
31 January, which ended with the first convoy of trucks escorted by the Kenyan army.
However, only a third of the traffic is therefore assured out of the normal 1250 daily
trucks, bearing in mind that the cost is raised for security reasons.68 Ugandan importers
put the probability to receiving goods in good condition at  50%. In this context,  the
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northern corridor, which is already well-known for its administrative lethargy, operates
in slow-motion and impacts heavily on the volume of trade. Concerning imports,  the
accumulated delay in the delivery of  oil  products,  apart  from the increase in prices,
punish all downstream activity that must also to bear with deficiency in the supply of
capital goods leading to a rise in technical unemployment and a decline in the turnover of
some companies. It is, for example, the case of the Madhvani group of industries, whose
forecast of 150,000 tons in its sugar sector transactions will not be possible to achieve due
to lack of  material.  Of  more concern,  according to  FAO,  essential  food products  like
cereals  (wheat,  corn,  barley)  already  in  insufficient  quantities  due  to  unfavourable
climatic  conditions,  are  beginning  to  miss  and  could  trigger  a  period  of  food  crisis
worsened by the displacement of refugees. Exports involving perishable goods (coffee,
tea, fish), or 30% of the GDP, are experiencing a decline whereas insurance companies
refuse to take on the transportation charges. Only coffee industry managed to clear a
surplus in December 2007 (326,466 bags of coffee compared to 237,168 bags).
26 Despite this grim situation, Ugandan authorities sought to downplay the effects in their
latest report on the impact of the Kenyan violence on the Ugandan economy.69 Thus, on
15 February, URA (Uganda Revenue Authority) spokesman Patrick Mukiibi put the scale
of the crisis into perspective by revealing that the fiscal results had only marginally been
achieved. The decrease is only US$ 1.34 million on the estimated revenue (-1%), thanks to
better  internal  revenue  that  made  it  possible  to  compensate  losses  on  the  customs
revenue of about $5.2 million (-7%). The January growth rate will nevertheless be the
lowest in eight years but the rate of inflation, which has been boosted by the increase in
prices of fuel could be quite low (the month of January was only be characterized by a
further  one  point  inflation)  following  the  choice  by  industrialists  to  find  other
alternatives  to  road  transport.  Abe  Selassie,  the  IMF  permanent  representative  in
Kampala,  still  maintained his  confidence in the Ugandan economy to cope with this
period in view of the proper observance “economic fundamental,” but he recognizes that
exposing the country to such risks should lead to review the supply sources and to invest
in infrastructure. Some business quarters sought to remain confident while hoping for a
redeployment of investments planned for
27 Kenya to other countries of the region but this point of view seems somewhat optimistic:
the investors could very well move away from a region whose pole of stability, which
hitherto has been Kenya, is experiencing a crisis a way out of which is still not known.
The tourist sector is in this respect revealing: cancellations also occurred in Tanzania and
Uganda.
 
The need to find an alternative to the northern corridor
28 The decision by Rwanda to import part of its energy from the port of Dar is Salaam since
the oil shortage70, the example of the convoy of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) transporting steel to Ajumani, Uganda, which was rerouted to Dar es
Salaam during the crisis at a 20% surcharge and a longer distance that cannot be ignored
which finally led to the dispatch of a Ugandan government delegation to the Tanzanian
port71 on 4 February, to officially inspect port facilities, and at the same time unofficially
apply  pressure  on  the  Kenyan  government,  reveal  the  extreme  vulnerability  of
landlocked countries to the same northern corridor which already in normal times does
not ensure efficient deadlines.
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29 The crisis should at least make all the actors realize the need to find the way out the
impasse, although the conditions are quite limiting. One way or another, this will happen
through the acceleration and a concretization of regional infrastructure projects such as
reinitiating the second corridor between Dar es Salaam in Kampala via Mwanza, and at
the same time ensuring better flow of traffic.72 The first obstacle is releasing the millions
of  dollars  needed  for  the  extension  of  the  pipeline,  which  now  reaches  Eldoret,  to
Kampala andto once and for all overcome the intra-Kenyan quarrels as well as political
and financial interests. Secondly, there is need to modernize Tanzanian infrastructure,
which are very from the standards of a new East African hub.73 The port of Dar is Salaam
only handles 165,000 containers per year compared to the 300,000 by Mombasa74 and
requires a waiting period of two weeks. The state of roads does not allow transit of the
heaviest trucks, which must use obsolete railway facilities. In comparison to the northern
corridor, the central corridor currently implies a surcharge of US$ 3000 to US$ 4000 per
container.  Consequent  investment  is  therefore  indispensable  to  improve  the  port’s
productivity, to modernize the railway line as well as the road network. Finally, there is
need to strengthen the fleet in order to transport the goods from Mwanza to Port Bell
near Kampala. This ambitious challenge is not new but the emergency of the situation
could enable the countries, for once, to overcome partisan interests.
 
Conclusion
30 The Kenyan political crisis, since the 27 December 2007 elections, upset the economic and
social  situation of the country and the region.  Due to escalation of violence that cut
means of  communication,  all  the economic sectors  incurred heavy losses,  weakening
their  financial  balance.  Efforts  by former UN Secretary-General  K.  Annan,  as  well  as
pressure from donors, to help negotiate an agreement between President M. Kibaki and
his rival R. Odinga, do not mean that the country will quickly recover from the situation.
At the national level, the finance minister officially revised the predicted growth rate of
the GDP for 2008 by three points (5% instead of the predicted 8%).
31 Moreover,  poor  weather  conditions  do  not  augur  well  for  this  year’s  production  by
agricultural sector. At the limit, the immediate announcements of fundamental reforms,
redistribution measures in respect of underprivileged regions and those left out by the
growth, will be necessary to slow down or stop the build-up of violence. According to
Steven Smith, chairman of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, there will be need for
12 to 18 months to recover the levels of activity achieved in 2007. At the regional level,
business  environment  realizes  that  the  country’s  regional  economic  power  has
deteriorated.75 The  danger  of  Kenya  losing  its  status  as  the  hub  for  the  landlocked
countries76 does not seem credible in the near future, considering the central corridor’s
lack  of  competitiveness,  but  in  a  more  faraway  future  it  is  possible  that  the  power
relations change.  All  depends of  the capacity of  Kenya’s  partners (Uganda,  Tanzania,
Rwanda and Burundi) to weigh in regional and international institutions to clear the
necessary funding for the modernization of the port of Dar are Salaam.
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1. Kenya can depend on its performing agro-food industry in which big companies are
involved. The country also has manufactured products and enjoys highly developed mass
tourism.
2. Importing companies needed government approval to buy some foreign products.
3. From 1993 (with effect from 1995), the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
4. The East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda and Burundi since
1 July 2007), which was formally relaunched on 15 January 2001 would like to go beyond
the common market stage by stressing more on the coordination of regional policies,
especially infrastructure,  through institutional cooperation.  The political  crisis,  which
affected the member countries in various ways, is a test for this organization. Will it be
able to use its  weight to ensure continuity in trade and insist  on necessary regional
reforms to avoid such deadlocks in future? Its relative silence seemed not to demonstrate
this ability in February in 2008.
5. The volume of GDP growth rate in Kenya was 1% in 1999, 0.5% and 0.6% in 2001 (World
Bank).
6. World Bank, 2007.
7. World Bank (2007).
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8. Kaldor’s magic square includes the four objectives of conjunctural policy, which is GDP,
inflation, employment and external balance.
9. Government of Kenya, Economic Survey, Nairobi, Government Printers, 2003.
10. Quadrupled deficit was observed between 2005 and 2006. However, at the beginning of
M. Kibaki’s term this deficit, without grants, had reached 9% of the GDP for the 2002/2003
financial year.
11. The rosy economic situation that Kenya had before the elections (growth attained
5.3%  in  volume  for  the  2006/2007  financial  year)  had  not  changed  in  any  way  the
inequalities among its people. Kenya is among the group of ten countries on earth where
social disparities are the worst, with incomes among the richest being 56 times higher
than the incomes among the poorest, according to a United Nations report in 2004. 51.8%
of the people live under the poverty line (OCDE, 2006).
12. The HDI index includes GDP per capita, the literacy rates and life expectancy. From
0.56% in 1990, it was 0.53% in 2006 and with wide gaps, in Nairobi (0.75 which is the
medium level in Turkey), in Mombasa (0.65, the South African level) and in north and
western parts of the country in Busia and Turkana (0.32, the level in Mali and Niger).
Recent efforts in the education sector in Kenya should, however, improve this in the
medium term.
13. World Bank classification:  Countries with low revenue below 765 dollars in 1995;
countries with medium revenue between 765 and 9,386 dollars in 1995; countries with
high revenue above 9,386 in 1995.
14. World Bank, 2006.
15. Business Daily, 28 January 2008.
16. To the tune of 770 million dollars.
17. Central Bank of Kenya, 2007.
18. 900 million dollars in 2006, the first source of foreign exchange for country (French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
19. On 7 August 1998, two simultaneous attacks rocked US embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam (Tanzania), killing 224 people and injuring several hundreds of people. On 28
November 2002, a suicide attack on a hotel in Mombasa caused 18 deaths. A rocket attack
on an Israeli  airline  aircraft  shortly  after  managed to  plunge  Kenyan tourism to  its
darkest period.
20. The country has the highest concentration of banks in the region: 45 commercial
banks make up the banking sector (Barclay Bank, Standard Chartered Bank), State banks
(Kenya  Commercial  Bank,  National  Bank  of  Kenya),  family  banks  (Kantaria)
complemented  by  a  number  of  non-banking  institutions.  There  are  also  95 foreign
exchange bureaux.
21. The country two large companies are Safaricom and Celtel Kenya. They have managed
to take advantage of infrastructural  obsoleteness of  fixed telephone service by State-
owned Telkom Kenya to highly develop themselves, starting with one million subscribers
in 2002 and increasing them to nearly eight million in 2007.
22. Improvement of the GPRS and EDGE networks by Safaricom and Celtel operators is
ongoing. The extension of the the 3G networks and fibre optics is also ongoing (Kenya
Data Networks).
23. Inter-Government Authority on Development.
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24. An organization that is supposed to promote regional intergration through trade and
investment in southern and eastern Africa. The member countries are Burundi, Comoros,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Uganda, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Libya.
25. Oil products, companies’ capital assets, consumer products.
26. World Bank, 2007. Exports to Uganda increased in 2007 to 656 million dollars, 80% of
this are re-exported oil products; at the same time, exports to Rwanda increased to 112.5
million dollars.
27. Refer to R. Porhel, 2004.
28. Daily Nation, 11 January 2008. Three supermarkets, two petrol stations, restaurants
and small traders’ stalls were destroyed. The estimation of the losses during the firts five
days was 44 million dollars but the cost rose rapidly. The “Kisumu City Business Disrtict
Association” even considered that twenty years would be the sufficient time to recover
from the loss. Even though it is an exagerration, this figure can give us an idea of the
scale of the damage.
29. Daily Nation, 3 January 2008.
30. An input is a product used in the manufacture of other products.
31. CNN, 11 January 2008. The big losers were: East African Breweries, Barclays, Kenya
Commercial Bank, Ken Gen, Equity Bank, Mumias.
32. Daily Nation, 11 January, 2008.
33. The fact that the Diaspora continues to transfer capital is aid that cannot be ignored
in maintaining the value of money on the market. Business Sunday Nation, 25 February
2008.
34. The rate for 91 days and 184 days were 6.86% and 7.84% respectively on 9 December
and they rose to 7.33 and 8.35 on 17 February.
35. The rating is the ranking of countries according to risk and give information for
investors.
36. AFP, January 2008.
37. Among the members of this group are namely Boeing, Cargill, Cisco, Exxon Mobil,
General Motors, Coca Cola and even Starbucks.
38. Daily Nation, 15 January 2008.
39. ‘Conflict Threatens Kenya Tourism.’ Mc Clatchy News Services, 19 January 2008.
40. Daily Nation, 15 January 2008.
41. The East African, 28 January 2008.
42. Statement at the Berlin tourism exhibition by Achim Steiner, executive director of
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), 7 March 2008.
43. In Morocco, the 2003 attacks on a hotel and restaurants patronized by foreigners and
Jewish establishments in the city of Casablanca caused 45 deaths, including 12 suicide
bombers. Yet Moroccan tourism experienced a boom during the first ten months of 2004,
with 17% rise compared to the same period the previous year. In Egypt, an attack was
carried out in October 2004 on Taba along the border with Israel, hitting Hilton Hotel,
which was mainly occupied by Israelis,  leading to the death of 30 people.  Despte the
attack the sector realized a spectacular growth of 34% the same year.
44. Daily Nation, 20 March 2008.
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45. Unilever Tea suffered from 11 % drop in production respresenting a loss of KSh 30
million, accompanied by a slump in the value of its stocks.
46. ‘Political unrest sparks food insecurity, livehood losses.’ Food Security in Kenya—IRIN
News, 14 January 2008. URL: http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/76221/kenya-
political-unrest-sparks-food-insecurity-livelihood-losses [archive].
47. ‘Kenya faces famine threat.’ Daily Nation, 23 January 2008.
48. Tea auctions were interrupted as a large part of the production came from the Rift
Valley. Consequently, the 10% reduction in Kenya production caused an increase in the
prices, according to FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization).
49. According to Richard Fox of Homegrown Limited Corporate Responsibility, 80% of the
workers continued working.
50. Naivasha town suddenly went up in flames on 27 January when groups of Kikuyu
youth in support  of  President  M.  Kibaki  began attacking members  of  the opposition
leader R.  Odinga’s  ethnic community.  Ten people who attempted to escape from the
Kikuyu attackers were burnt alive in a block of houses.
51. The loses were worth 10 billion shillings,  according to Jane Ngigi,  director of the
Kenya Flower Council.
52. ‘Tea sector limps on as workers trickle back.’ The East African, 14 January 2008.
53. The Standard, 29 January 2008.
54. ‘Kenya flower buyers get jitters despite continuing supply.’ The East African, 28 January
2008.
55. Many companies applied for re-scheduling or the cancellation of the interests for this
period. Business Sunday Nation, 18 February 2008.
56. Samuel Deya is the executive director of the Adock Timo, one of the main micro-
finance institutions in Kenya.
57. Business Sunday Nation, 18 February 2008.
58. Business Sunday Nation, 18 February 2008.
59. Kenya’s Business Community, January 2008.
60. International Crisis Group: Kenya in crisis, op.cit.
61. Daily Nation, 14 January 2008.
62. The Monitor, 14 January 2008.
63. Kenya is the transit point for a quarter of Rwanda’s and Uganda’s GNP, a third of
Burundi’s GNP.
64. From 1.34 to 3.36 dollars. The Monitor, 9 January 2008.
65. ‘Kenya tourism, economy devastated by violence’ , CNN, 11 January 2008.
66. Northern Corridor: Mombasa-Kampala via Nairobi and Eldoret.
67. Daily Nation online, Business Daily, 9 February 2008.
68. 500  dollars  per  lorry  on  Mombasa-Malaba/Busia  road  and  254 dollars  between
Mombasa  and Nairobi.  Traffic  returned to  normalcy  very  slowly.  Malaba  recorded a
resumption of its daily transactions in mid-February compared to January, rising from
100 to 250. Busia recovered even slower with 150 transactions from 100. The country’s
business quarters estimated three months for a definite return to fluid traffic, which is
the same as the time needed to decongest the Mombasa port.
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69. Report by the Uganda Revenue Authority. The EastAfrican, 18 February 2008.
70. ‘Business forecast Report for Tanzania’ by Business Monitor International, 2007.
71. The East African, 12 March 2008.
72. Central Corridor: Dar es Salaam-Mwanza-Port Bell-Kampala ; Porhel, R. (2004).
73. Hub:  A  place  which  collects  and  redistributes  goods  and  travellers  to  various
directions from a transport network dominated by an airport. This is the case of Nairobi
in which a network of tarmacked roads, railways and pipelines converge. 
74. ‘Business Forecast Report for Tanzania.’ Business Monitor International, 2007.
75. Patrick Obath is the chairman of the federation of Kenyan employers.
76. Terry Ryan, economist at the University of Nairobi. News Voacom, 11 February 2008.
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